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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last ten years there have been litigated a number of class
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action claims of compensation discrimination that have involved mul-
tiple regression proofs.1 Regressions have been submitted by plain-
tiffs attempting to make a prima facie case, by defendants attempting
to rebut that case, or, most often, by both parties attempting to show
the merit of their respective positions. Some of these cases involved
only claims of pay (I use this term synonymously with "salary" and
"wage rate") discrimination; others included claims of hiring, assign-
ment, or promotion discrimination as well.
An interesting issue is whether these multiple regression proofs of
pay discrimination enhance the administration of justice. Do they
help the courts detect the existence of pay discrimination? This issue
gets at questions such as whether the courts require regression models
to conform to the law, whether the courts understand regression
methods and results, and how they choose between two or more com-
peting regressions.
A reading of the published cases makes evident, however, that
more is involved. The use of multiple regression proofs in class pay
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 cannot be criti-
qued without resolving a larger issue, one intimately connected to the
proper use of regressions. That issue, in its broadest form, is: what is
class pay discrimination? The United States Supreme Court provided
some clarification of that issue in its 1981 decision in County of Wash-
ington v. Gunther,3 where it decided that sex-based pay claims under
Title VII are not required to meet the Equal Pay Act4 standard of
showing "substantially" equal work for the males and females being
compared.5 This decision opened the door to broader claims of pay
discrimination under Title VII than are possible under the Equal Pay
Act, but provided little guidance about the kinds of claims now author-
ized. Court opinions in class pay cases, decided both before and after
Gunther, indicate that confusion exists about what constitutes pay
discrimination.
The courts espouse two general answers to this question in a multi-
ple regression context. The first is that class discrimination exists
when there remains a difference between the average salary of male
and female (or black and white) employees within an establishment
after the gross difference in average salary has been adjusted for any
sexual differences that may exist in general labor market qualifica-
1. These claims are discussed generally in B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 1342 (2d ed. 1983).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 225 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982)).
3. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
4. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206 (1982)).
5. This decision is discussed in W. FOGEL, THE EQUAL PAY ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
COMPARABLE WORTH 99 (1984).
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tions, such as years of schooling and experience.6 The second answer
is similar, except for the crucial difference that the sexual difference
in average salary must also be adjusted for male-female differences in
job level before discrimination can be proven.7 The first view autho-
rizes establishment-wide comparisons of male and female pay after
controlling for the pay influences of general labor market qualifica-
tions. The second authorizes pay comparisons only after the pay influ-
ence of the employee's job level is taken into account; in other words,
only within job levels.
These differing views are complicated further by the fact that some
courts will only permit establishment-wide pay comparisons without
job level controls to be evidence relevant to discrimination in job allo-
cation (hiring, assignment, and promotion), rather than in pay, while
others have ruled that these establishment-wide comparisons can
make a prima facie case of pay discrimination.8
Since court decisions about multiple regression evidence follow
court views about what constitutes pay discrimination, analysis and
conclusions about the latter issue are prerequisites for a review of re-
gression usage. Consequently, this Article deals with both the nature
of class pay discrimination and the proper use of multiple regression
proofs for class pay claims. Since class pay claims usually start with
average salary differences, the Article first describes the structural
sources of class salary differences within establishments. Part III ex-
amines these sources within the context of pay discrimination law, and
develops the law of class pay discrimination. Part IV considers the
purported explanations (models) of employee pay differences that are
the foundations of multiple regression analyses, while Part V looks at
the fit between multiple regression proofs and the law of pay discrimi-
nation. In parts VI and VII the Article reviews the decisions of the
courts in pay cases that have involved regressions. Finally part VIII
draws conclusions about both pay discrimination law and multiple re-
gression proofs.
Throughout, I shall refer principally to sex-based claims. Female
claims have been predominant within this kind of action, but my ref-
erence to sex-based litigation is largely for stylistic convenience. Ex-
6. See, e.g., Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984) (alleging
sex discrimination in the advancement of teachers at a state college); Melani v.
Board of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y., 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (alleg-
ing sex discrimination against women at a city university); Greenspan v. Automo-
bile Club of Mich., 495 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (alleging race and sex
discrimination).
7. See, e.g., EEOC v. IBM Corp., 583 F. Supp. 875 (D. Md. 1984) (alleging racial dis-
crirnination); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (alleging
sex discrimination with respect to salaries and pensions for females); Pouncy v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (alleging racial dis-
crimination in employment), aff'd, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
8. Specific cases will be cited infra notes 67-69 & 103 and accompanying text.
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cept as indicated the analysis applies as readily to pay discrimination
charges made by any other protected class.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF PAY DIFFERENCES
Given the wide disparity in the earnings of men and women for the
nation as a whole, it can be safely said that the average salary of wo-
men in most establishments (private firms and government agencies)
is well below that of men. Class actions on pay begin with that fact.
There are three structural sources of a sexual difference in average
salary within establishments.
First, the most commonly cited cause of a sexual pay difference is
that women are concentrated in low paid jobs relative to men.9 A very
large part of establishment pay differences between the sexes can or-
dinarily be attributed to these differing job distributions.O This
means, of course, that equalizing the percentages of men and women
employed on all jobs would essentially eliminate a sexual difference in
average pay within an establishment.
Second, from an alternative point of view, sexual pay differences in
an establishment are due to the fact that there are wage or salary dif-
ferences among the establishment's various jobs, with top manage-
ment people usually receiving pay that is many times larger than that
of the lowest paid employees. Conceivably, discrimination law could
be used to reduce the size of these job pay differentials, and thereby
reduce sexual pay differences. In the extreme situation, if all jobs pro-
vided the same salary, there would be no pay differences between men
and women (abstracting from differences in time worked).
Finally, sex differences in average salary can occur because of the
pay variation that can occur around the wage or salary rate for each
job in an establishment. The compensation system in most establish-
ments includes not only the basic salary of a job, but also provisions
for salary increases to individual job-holders based on job perform-
ance, length of employment, or other criteria. Most systems formalize
these provisions by grouping all jobs into job levels (or pay grades),
each of which will have a basic salary and a specified salary range to
accommodate individual pay increases. The basic salary and range
will apply to all jobs included in a job level. Disparate treatment can
occur within this structure through differences in initial placement
within the salary range and differences in the timing and size of dis-
9. See Kahne & Konen, Economic Perspectives on the Roles of Women in the Amer-
ican Economy, 13 J. ECON. LIT. 1249, 1257 (1975); Malkiel & Malkiel, Male-Fe-
male Pay Differentials in Professional Employment, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 693, 704
(1974).
10. See, e.g., Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F. Supp. 917 (D.D.C. 1981),
affd, 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F.
Supp. 427 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
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cretionary pay increases. Ordinarily, the contribution of pay variation
within job levels to a sex difference in average pay for an entire estab-
lishment is small because differences between the basic and maximum
salary of a salary range are small-25 to 40 percent--compared to the
differences that exist in salaries across job levels.11
In order to reduce sexual pay differences markedly, female distri-
butions among an establishment's jobs must come to more nearly
match those of men, or the pay differentials among an establishment's
jobs must be reduced. Litigation to this point has concentrated on the
former, through suits to ensure equal access for women and other pro-
tected classes to all jobs. Discrimination in job allocation-hiring, as-
signment, and promotion-is a concept that is relatively easy for
litigants and the courts to grasp, because it implies that an employer is
treating the objective job qualifications of women differently than
those of men. Job pay differentials, on the other hand, tend to be seen
as largely beyond an employer's control because they are set by labor
market processes over which the individual employer has little influ-
ence. In short, our economic system is seen as giving employers much
more control over hiring and promotion than over pay differentials.
Furthermore, aside from the market, there is no objective basis for
determining what are equitable pay differentials among jobs; equita-
ble employment distributions seem easier to determine.
Recently, however, because women are making only slow gains in
job access, they have begun to challenge job pay differentials as well as
unequal job distributions.12 The next section considers possible statu-
tory remedies for sexual pay differences due to all three of the struc-
tural causes: unequal job distributions, job pay differentials, and
disparate treatment within job levels.
III. STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR SEXUAL
PAY DIFFERENCES
The simple fact that there is a difference in the average salaries of
the male and female employees in an establishment is ambiguous with
respect to the possible discriminatory cause of the difference (and, of
course, does not indicate whether the pay difference is a product of
11. T. PATTEN, JR., PAY: EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVE PLANS 281
(1977). Some employers, notably IBM, have larger salary ranges, making possible
sizeable employee pay differences within job levels:
[E]ach position in IBM is assigned a two digit salary level. At each salary
level there is a set range of possible salaries, which is adjusted annually
for industry competitiveness. The maximum figure in the range is 60
percent higher than the minimum figure which allows the company to
reward the more effective employee.
EEOC v. IBM Corp., 583 F. Supp. 875, 879 (D. Md. 1984).
12. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979).
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discriminatory or nondiscriminatory causes). In particular, the two
major possible sources for the pay difference-unequal job distribu-
tions and unequal pay rates-are actually opposite sides of the same
coin and, therefore, are completely interdependent. In the abstract,
that is without additional facts, either can be viewed as the discrimina-
tory source of the salary difference: women have low pay because
they are unlawfully concentrated in low paying jobs, or because the
pay for the jobs they are concentrated in is unlawfully set at low
levels, or because of a combination of these causes. And, as discussed,
disparate treatment within pay grades (job levels) can contribute to
the salary differences, although, usually, only to a minor degree.
Ordinarily, in this context, the particular discrimination claim
made by plaintiffs to remedy class salary differences could be ex-
pected to depend, in an uncomplicated way, upon the nature of the
facts that go beyond the simple one of an average salary difference
between the sexes. But uncertainty exists about what constitutes a
pay discrimination claim, and this uncertainty carries over to the evi-
dence, particularly multiple regression evidence, needed for attacking
each of the three possible sources of a sexual pay difference in an es-
tablishment. In this section I will attempt to clarify, with only brief
reference to regression evidence, the connections between a sex differ-
ence in average salary and the discrimination claims that can be made
against each of the three possible sources of the sexual salary differ-
ence. This legal framework will later be used to assess the use of mul-
tiple regression evidence in pay claims.
A. Unequal Job Distributions
The fact that there is a difference between the average salary of
male and female employees in an establishment is, of course, hardly
evidence of anything. But to the extent that this fact is given any
weight, it is credited by the courts as indicative of unequal job distribu-
tions between the sexes that may have been arrived at either by the
employer's intentionally disparate treatment of women in job alloca-
tions-hiring, assignment, and promotion-or by the unintentional ef-
fect of a neutral but unnecessary employment practice (disparate
impact). The fact of the sexual salary difference is not considered sug-
gestive of pay discrimination. One typical trial court opinion noted
that a difference in the average salaries of males and females for an
entire establishment may be crudely suggestive of discrimination in
job allocation, but does not provide evidence of "independent salary
discrimination, (that is, a salary disparity which does not accrue
merely via mechanical operation of discrimination in placement and
[Vol. 65:289
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promotion). ... 13
Logically, there is little reason why an average pay difference be-
tween the sexes is more indicative of discrimination in job allocation
than in pay setting. A priori, it would seem that rates of pay for an
employer's jobs could be established on the basis of sex as easily as
jobs could be assigned on the basis of sex. The court view that a sexual
salary difference is more likely to be caused by the latter has three
bases. First, the courts, like policy makers generally, view the major
employment problem of protected groups to be that of under-
representation in good jobs, and view Title VII as enacted chiefly to
remedy this problem, rather than to interfere with wage setting.' 4
Second, the courts believe that employers have more control over job
allocation than over wage rates, with the latter determined by a labor
market that the employer must accede to in order to maintain a work
force.15 Third, the courts may realize that an inference from a sexual
difference in average pay to pay discrimination-rather than job allo-
cation discrimination-implies a judgment that the salaries for at least
some jobs that predominantly employ women are discriminatory rela-
tive to those for male dominated jobs, and that such a judgment neces-
sarily implies comparisons of salaries and work requirements or
contributions across different jobs and is, therefore, unauthorized by
Title VII. This point will be developed further in the next section.
It is apparent that sexual salary differences associated with une-
qual job distributions can be reduced if employer discrimination in job
allocation can be shown. Multiple regressions that adjust average sal-
ary differences for sexual differences in job qualifications have been
used for this purpose, as will be described later.16 Unfortunately,
some courts have considered precisely the same kind of regression evi-
dence as also probative for a claim of pay discrimination.17 I will argue
later that the latter is wrong under Title VII.
Aside from the need to properly order proofs and claims, the im-
portance of this distinction between job allocation and pay discrimina-
tion goes to the remedy. If average salary evidence (refined by
13. Smith v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 960, 983 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
14. "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the lan-
guage of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971).
15. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224,284 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
16. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 1404 (1984); Greenspan v.
Automobile Club of Mich., 495 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
17. See, e.g., Melani v. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y., 561 F. Supp. 769
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Mich., 495 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D.
Mich. 1980).
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regression) is considered evidence of unequal job distributions arrived
at by discrimination in job allocation, the remedy will be to provide
equal access to all jobs for women (in addition to back pay for the job
discrimination). If, on the other hand, courts view the average salary
evidence as indicative of pay discrimination, the remedy will be an in-
crease in the relative pay of female dominated jobs.
B. Job Pay Rate Differences
Until the Supreme Court's 1981 Gunther decision it was widely
held that a sex-based pay discrimination claim could not be made
about the pay differences between two or more jobs unless the plain-
tiffs also alleged that the work of the jobs being compared was equal.
The 1963 Equal Pay Act had prohibited the payment of unequal wages
or salaries to women who were doing work equal to that of men in the
same establishment.18 The courts correctly interpreted Congressional
intent for the meaning of "equal work" to encompass only jobs that
are substantially similar in work content,19 i.e., have a substantial core
of common tasks and require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
similar working conditions for the noncommon tasks. 20 Thus, the
Equal Pay Act does not permit so-called comparable worth claims:
that is, that the pay differences between men and women employed on
unequal jobs are discriminatory when seen in the light of the skill and
other requirements of the jobs.
Until 1981 sex-based pay claims (and race-based in some courts2 1 )
under Title VII had to meet the Equal Pay Act standard of proving
equal work, thus blocking the possibility of comparable worth claims
under the former as well as the latter. This interpretation existed be-
cause of a provision (the "Bennett Amendment") inserted into Title
VII just prior to its 1964 enactment stating that sexual pay differentia-
tions "authorized" under the Equal Pay Act were also lawful under
Title VII.22 The courts nearly unanimously interpreted that provision
to mean that pay claims involving unequal jobs were not permitted
under Title VII because they were not permitted under the Equal Pay
18. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
19. E.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970).
20. See W. FOGEL, supra note 5, at 58.
21. Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 456 F. Supp. 65, 68 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Pat-
terson v. Western Dev. Labs, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 772, 776 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Smith v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 960, 992
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
22. The provision states in part: "It shall not be an unlawful employment practice
under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in
determining the amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employ-
ees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of
section 206(d) of Title 29 [The Equal Pay Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
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Act.23 In its Gunther decision, however, the Supreme Court decided
(by a five to four margin) that the Equal Pay Act "authorized" only
the Act's four affirmative employer defenses for wage differentials be-
tween the sexes, 24 and did not authorize pay differentials based on sex
among jobs that did not involve equal work. The Court kept its deci-
sion narrow, stating only that claims of intentional pay discrimination
that did not involve assertions of equal work could be brought under
Title VII, and explicitly stated that it was not authorizing comparable
worth claims.25
Since Gunther, the law of pay discrimination has been roughly
sketched, if not firmly drawn. Gunther, and nearly all lower court
decisions that have found sexually based pay differentials between
employees performing unequal work, have focused on narrow proofs
of the sexual basis for the pay difference. 26 The proofs have provided
direct evidence of intent to discriminate, by showing that women were
paid less relative to men than they would have been paid had existing
job evaluations, conducted or paid for by the employer, been fol-
lowed.27 Certainly, job evaluations are not the only possible means of
23. Exceptions to that interpretation were Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980) (Bennett Amendment merely in-
corporates into Title VII the four exceptions noted in the Act but is not limited,
as is the Act, to situations where equal or substantially equal work is being per-
formed); Gunther v. County of Wash., 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979) (Title VII is
broader in scope than the Equal Pay Act), affd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
24. The affirmative defenses for unequal pay are: 1) a seniority system; 2) a merit
system; 3) a piece rate or incentive system; and 4) "any other factor other than
sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
25. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981).
26. Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 662
F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 459 U.S. 809 (1982), affd, 695 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.
1983); International Union Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d
1094 (3d Cir. 1980); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. State
of Wash., 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
27. In American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. State of Wash., 578 F.
Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), there was the additional evidence that state offi-
cials, including two governors, had admitted that the pay for female dominated
jobs was inequitable and had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain remedial legisla-
tive appropriations. Id. at 860-62. Thus, there was evidence suggesting that wage-
setting for female dominated jobs was discriminatory; court judgments about the
relative worth of different jobs or the proper bases for job pay differences were
not necessary to reach this conclusion. The trial court was convinced by this evi-
dence that the State of Washington had intentionally discriminated against wo-
men in pay setting. The court of appeals decided otherwise, finding that the
state's failure to pay women their job evaluation wage rates was legitimately mo-
tivated by the desire to pay (lower) market rates. State of Wash. v. American
Fed'n State, County & Mun. Employees, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985). The
conflict between the two decisions demonstrates the difficulty of proving an em-
ployer motive to discriminate in the face of an asserted reliance upon the market.
See also American Nurses Ass'n v. State of Ill., 606 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Ill. 1985).
There, the court found that the employer was not bound to implement job evalua-
tions that it had commissioned, distinguishing the case from Gunther on the
1986]
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proving sex-based pay differentials. Conversations, memoranda,
meetings, etc., showing that an employer was influenced in setting
wage rates for jobs by the female proportion of employment in them,
would also suffice. Nonetheless, the scope of possible proofs appears
to be limited.
Specifically, claims that require courts to infer a sexual basis for
pay differentials based upon court comparisons of job tasks and quali-
fications, or based on judgments about what are permissible bases for
pay differences, were not authorized by Gunther and have not been
allowed in subsequent lower court decisions.28 The only exception to
this conclusion has been a trial court decision, Briggs v. City of
Madison,29 where the court found prima facie sex-based pay discrimi-
nation based on its comparison of the work requirements for public
health nurses (females) and sanitarians (males). The defendant ulti-
mately prevailed with a "market" defense for the pay differential.
This decision has not been followed by any other court.
Sex-based claims that require courts to make judgments about job
pay differentials appear to be barred by the history of the Equal Pay
Act-particularly the replacement of the requirement in the original
legislation of equal pay for "comparable" work with that of equal pay
for "equal" work-and by the Bennett Amendment's obvious purpose
of reconciling Title VII with the Equal Pay Act.30 It is not clear that
the Gunther decision is contrary to that view. The Supreme Court
rightly decided in Gunther that the Bennett Amendment did not bar
all claims that pay differences between unequal jobs are based on sex.
That decision was correct because Congress in passing the Equal Pay
grounds that the County of Washington bad "adopted" the job evaluation system
that it failed to implement for female matrons, while the State of Illinois had
made no such adoption. Id. at 1317. The ninth circuit endorsed this distinction in
AFSCME. The distinction fails, I believe, because the facts do not indicate em-
ployer "adoption" of the subject job evaluation system in Gunther. Of the three
employers, the State of Washington appears to have gone farthest in adopting a
job evaluation system that became central to plaintiff's charges of intentional pay
discrimination. It failed to implement the job evaluation system only because the
funds to do so were not appropriated. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun.
Employees v. State of Wash., 578 F. Supp. 846, 860-63 (W.D. Wash. 1983). See
generally Fogel, Intentional Sex-Based Pay Discrimination: Can It Be Proven?,
37 LABOR L.J. - (1986) (forthcoming).
28. See, e.g., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 511 (1984); Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir.
1983); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1111
(N.D. Ala. 1984); EEOC v. Affiliated Foods, Inc., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA)
943 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Connecticut State Employees' Assoc. v. Connecticut, 31 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 191 (D. Conn. 1983); Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp.
721 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
29. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
30. See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 188 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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Act had not comprehensively considered the subject of pay differen-
tials among unequal jobs, but had only decided not to authorize pay
claims that were based on work comparisons of dissimilar jobs.31 It is
also true that the Court did not issue a ruling that the Equal Pay Act
and its legislative history, in conjunction with the Bennett Amend-
ment, do not bar claims of pay discrimination under Title VII that are
based solely on unequal job comparisons; it did not consider that ques-
tion.3 2 In the absence of such a ruling, I believe that the legislative
histories of the Equal Pay Act and the Bennett Amendment are formi-
dable barriers to such claims under both the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII.
Of course, the Equal Pay Act does not govern pay discrimination
that has any basis other than sex.3 3 Nevertheless, the courts show no
propensity to find that Title VII authorizes them to make comparisons
of unequal jobs for wage setting purposes under claims brought on an-
other basis, race, for example.34 Conceivably, judgments to this effect
are influenced by the restrictive scope of sex-based pay claims that
Congress wrote into the Equal Pay Act and the Bennett Amend-
ment.35 More likely, they are based on the view that the judiciary
ought not to engage in wage-setting judgments that bypass the market
system of wage determination unless clear legislative authority for do-
ing so is provided. In Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank of Dal-
las, 36 the court advanced a burden-of-proof barrier and combined this
with a "market" hurdle to erect formidable obstacles to judicial wage-
setting, even in non-sex cases:
Concluding that at least for race-based wage discrimination cases we are
not restricted to claims of unequal pay for equal work does not mean that we
adopt a policy of independently setting out entire scales of relative wages for
dissimilar jobs according to the court's perception of each job's "worth," a
hopelessly involved task inappropriate of judicial resolution....
Courts need not engage in this sort of independent wage-setting even in
the absence of Equal Pay Act restrictions because of the basic principle that it
is the plaintiff's burden to prove discrimination in compensation. It would be
difficult for a plaintiff to prove that jobs dissimilar in duties and pay are of the
same "worth" to the employer. . . . Moreover, even were the first job
31. See W. FOGEL, supra note 5, at 102.
32. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 (1981).
33. But see cases cited supra note 21.
34. See, e.g., EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.
1983); EEOC v. IBM Corp., 583 F. Supp. 875 (D. Md. 1984); Vuyanich v. Republic
Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated on other grounds,
723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984).
35. See supra note 21. One court has stated: "We cannot conceive of any rationale
for applying a different legal standard in Title VII actions brought for compensa-
tion discrimination based on sex than would be applicable in actions brought for
compensation discrimination based on race." Patterson v. Western Dev. Labs, 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 772, 776 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
36. 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 723 F.2d. 1195 (5th
Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted).
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"worth" the same as the second to a race-blind employer, the market may
price those two jobs differently.3 7
It is clear that, while abstractly, a sex difference in average pay
within an establishment can suggest discrimination in job pay rates,
this is not so under the reality of pay discrimination law because that
suggestion necessarily implies a judgment that the rates of pay for
predominantly female jobs are sex-based. That judgment has been au-
thorized by Gunther where there exists direct evidence of intent to
discriminate, but it has not been authorized when the only evidence is
a sex difference in average salary, even when the difference is ad-
justed for employee qualification differences through regression pro-
cedures. The ultimate conclusion is that sex differences in average
salary are not likely to be reduced much by claims of pay
discrimination.
C. Pay Discrimination Within Job Levels
As described earlier, disparate pay treatment can occur within the
pay variation that extends beyond the basic wage rate or salary of a
job. In keeping with the class emphasis of this Article, I will limit my
discussion of this topic to the pay variation that occurs within the job
levels (or salary grades) that larger firms establish to systematize
their pay practices. 38 Each job level encompasses at least several jobs
that are different in their work tasks, but have roughly similar qualifi-
cation requirements as assessed by the level of skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility required. Since the base salary and salary range are the
same for all jobs included in a job level, the kind of pay discrimination
that can occur within a job level cannot involve differential job wage
rates or salaries-there are none. Rather, discrimination can take
place through disparate initial placement of women within the salary
range or disparate movement through it. Prima facie evidence of sex
discrimination within job levels would be provided by a sexual differ-
ence in the average pay of employees included within the job level.
Regression analyses can make this evidence more probative.
Whether courts will authorize claims of pay discrimination within
job levels is uncertain, but seems likely based on the preponderance of
rulings that have been made. Such claims are not authorized under
the Equal Pay Act because the jobs included within a job level do not
ordinarily involve equal work as that term is defined by the statute.
Prior to Gunther, several courts ruled that these claims, when based
37. Id. at 284.
38. Where jobs are not grouped into levels or grades, class claims of disparate pay
treatment can be based upon, among other things, comparisons of the size and
timing of pay increase of men and women. The comparisons can be on an estab-
lishment-wide basis, across unequal jobs, since they are not of job wage or salary
rates.
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on sex, are also not authorized under Title VII because of the Bennett
Amendment's incorporation of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII.39 At
least two trial courts extended that judgment to race claims of pay
discrimination within job levels, even though the scope of the Equal
Pay Act does not include race.40 In contrast, both before and after
Gunther, a number of court opinions have authorized, or commented
favorably on, race-based pay claims within job levels.41 It is likely that
similar claims based on sex will be permitted because of the Gunther
ruling. The Bennett Amendment notwithstanding, Title VII permits
these claims, based on sex as well as race, because they make pay com-
parisons only within a standard salary range. They do not require
comparisons of different wage rates or salaries for different jobs, and
are thus distinguished from comparable worth claims.
The touchstone of this kind of pay claim is that class pay compari-
sons are made only for employees who are under the same salary
range, even though they hold unequal jobs. Pay comparisons among
employees who are under different salary ranges are not authorized
(unless accompanied by a claim of equal work) even where employers,
atypically, group these employees into the same job level or grade.
While a number of courts have permitted claims of discrimination
across unequal jobs within job levels, to my knowledge none have ar-
ticulated this test of permissability-that the pay comparisons be
made within a standard salary range. Consequently, it is uncertain
whether these courts tacitly apply this test or merely require that the
comparisons be made within job levels regardless of whether the
levels encompass different salary ranges. The latter standard of
permissability, conceivably, could be premised on a view that it is all
right for courts to make judgments about the proper pay for similar
(but, under the Equal Pay Act, unequal) jobs, but not for dissimilar
ones.42 Neither is authorized by Title VII.
In summary, it is evident from this discussion that there are differ-
ent kinds of claims that can be made to remedy class differences in
average salary that are the product of establishment discrimination.
39. See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 281 (4th Cir. 1980); EEOC
v. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 733, 751 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Ste.
Marie v. Eastern R.R. Assoc., 458 F. Supp. 1147, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 650 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1981).
40. Smith v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 960, 992 (N.D. Cal.
1977); Patterson v. Western Dev. Labs, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 772, 776
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
41. See, e.g., EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 657 (4th Cir.
1983); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 284 (N.D. Tex.
1980); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp. 427, 449 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
affd, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982); Keely v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 404 F. Supp.
573, 578 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
42. This view is espoused in Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 446 (W.D.
Wis. 1982).
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There are claims of discrimination in job allocation and in compensa-
tion. Generally, average salary evidence will be probative of the for-
mer because pay claims that encompass unequal jobs are authorized
only on a limited basis: when there is direct evidence that pay differ-
entials have been established on the basis of sex, as in Gunther, where
female employees were not paid in accord with extant employer evalu-
ations of their jobs, while men were. Another possible pay claim is
that women are treated disparately within the standard salary range
of job levels, but such treatment usually can be only a minor source of
sexual pay differences.
IV. PAY REGRESSIONS
Statistical analyses, particularly in the form of multiple regression,
are frequently used to prove or disprove class claims of compensation
discrimination. Multiple regression is a mathematical and statistical
tool, widely used in scientific research, for analyzing complex relation-
ships between a set of factors (hence the term "multiple") and a phe-
nomenon that they are thought to influence.43 Specifically, it can
isolate the influence of a factor (variable) on individual employee
wages or salaries; it can separate the influence of one factor, sex for
example, from the influences of other factors that are alleged to influ-
ence pay. This capacity would appear to be ideal for analyzing wage
discrimination because it permits separation of the class membership
influence on salaries, if any, from other influences. However, regres-
sions only compute the quantitative relationships between explana-
tory variables and the dependent variable that is to be explained. The
cause of variation in the dependent variable cannot be determined by
the regression itself, but must be established by reasoning and experi-
mentation in combination with regression analysis.
The usual procedure in pay regressions is to develop ("model") an
equation for estimating employee pay that includes the variables
thought to influence pay. The equation is then "fitted" to the actual
observations (data) that exist for all employees or a sample of employ-
ees on each variable. The regression procedure will assign each ex-
planatory variable a "coefficient" that indicates the quantitative
association between the variable and employee pay. Sex, of course, is
a dichotomous variable; therefore, the sex coefficient will indicate the
average loss or gain in pay, minus $1000 annually for example, associ-
ated with being a female rather than male employee (assuming that
the sex scale is 1 = female and 0 = male). The sex coefficient will be
net of other influences; that is, will indicate the pay effect of being
female after other influences on pay, that may or may not be corre-
43. For more complete discussions of this technique, see Fisher, Multiple Regression
in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980); Rubinfeld & Steiner, Quanti-
tative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1983).
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lated with sex, have been taken into account. The sex coefficient will
be tested for statistical signficance to determine the likelihood that it
has resulted from sampling variation.44 If it is statistically significant,
the sex coefficient is submitted as evidence of pay discrimination
against women.
Unfortunately, it is easy to error in both the technical use of re-
gression analysis and in its application to discrimination law. This sec-
tion discusses regression models of pay largely from a social science
perspective. The next section then considers the merits of this tech-
nique for adjusting pay discrimination claims under Title VII.
A. The Regression Model
Multiple regression proofs begin with a purported or hypothesized
explanation of individual pay variation within a business or govern-
ment establishment. This model specification is extremely important
because the influence of sex or race cannot be confidently assessed
unless all other important influences on pay have been accounted
for.45 Some courts have errored by concluding that it is not important
to include variables in the model or pay estimation equation that are
difficult to quantify.46 If any important influence on salary, quantifi-
able or otherwise, is omitted from the regression, a confident assess-
ment of the influence of sex on pay cannot be made, unless it can be
shown that the omitted variable is uncorrelated with sex.47 If an im-
portant pay influence is omitted and evidence that it is uncorrelated
with sex is not available, a regression showing that sex affects pay may
be false because the omitted variable rather than sex is the true pay
influence.
Putting this another way, when the purported explanation of sala-
ries is incomplete, the influence of sex may be more apparent than
real because the more fundamental salary determinant omitted, job
performance ratings for example, may be correlated with sex as well
as salary. Of course, the error may also go in the other direction. If
the pay model includes a variable that is correlated with pay but is
influenced by sex, such as job level (where the level into which a job is
placed depends on its female proportion of employment) the true ef-
fect of sex on pay will be understated.
Questions of statutorily cognizable claims aside, when courts deal
with pay discrimination allegations based on sex differences in aver-
44. If this likelihood is one out of 20 or less (5 percent), courts generally accept the
coefficient as statistically significant.
45. Rubinfeld & Steiner, supra note 43, at 90.
46. E.g., Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 696 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd sub nom Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
47. See generally Bloom & Killingsworth, Pay Discrimination Research and Litiga-
tior the Use of Regression, 21 INDUST. RELATIONS 318 (1982).
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age salary they must ask two questions. First, what are the nondis-
criminatory determinants of salary in the subject establishment?
Second, after the influence of these nondiscriminatory factors has
been accounted for, does sex influence salary? It is obvious that the
extent to which nondiscriminatory variables explain salary variation
can affect the possibility that sex is important. In the extreme case, if
salary variation is fully accounted for by nondiscriminatory variables,
sex cannot possibly have anything to do with pay.
Because model specification is so important to regression analyses,
court opinions typically devote much attention to it, usually discussing
the models of both parties. Two general approaches can be identified
from the reported cases: human capital and establishment oriented.
B. Human Capital
This approach to individual pay determination is based on the
views that certain "investments," such as schooling and job training,
increase one's "human capital" and, therefore, one's productivity; and
that employers value this productivity and pay more for greater
amounts of it.48 Human capital theory hypothesizes generally that in-
dividual pay is determined by one's completed years of schooling and
years of work experience. 49 Occasionally other variables are added,
such as special training received and investments made in health care.
The theory has a productivity base because schooling and job experi-
ence are perceived as increasing an employee's productivity. Note,
however, that these purported pay determinants are, more fundamen-
tally, simply work or general labor market qualifications, and are only
assumed correlates of productivity, rather than actual measures of
productivity in particular establishments.
It is important to understand that this theoretic construct was de-
veloped by academicians to explain variation in the earnings of indi-
viduals in the entire society. Because of its generality, it can help to
explain pay variation in a variety of circumstances. The human capi-
tal model by itself, however, does not ordinarily include pay
determinents that are specific to employing establishments. There-
fore, the usefulness of this approach for explaining pay variation
within a given establishment is suspect. It is suspect, also, because
human capital models do not explain pay variation very well even for
the society as a whole. They typically account for no more than one-
third of earnings differences among male full time workers in the
United States.50 Such models are too general to explain very well em-
48. A succinct discussion of the human capital approach is in Vuyanich v. Republic
Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 265 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
49. See generally G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (1964).
50. Mincer, Progress in Human Capital Analyses of the Distribution of Earnings, in
THE PERSONAL DISTRInUTION OF INCOMES 146 (A. Atkinson ed. 1976).
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ployee differences in pay within establishments.
Nonetheless, some courts have given substantial deference to
human capital regressions in pay discrimination cases. 51 The principal
reason for this is a concern that a more establishment oriented model,
which ordinarily would be viewed as determining employee pay, may
be "tainted" by discrimination because the establishment oriented
variables, instead of accurately assessing productivity and other bases
of pay, are manipulated against the interests of women or other pro-
tected groups.5 2 On the other hand, a number of courts have accepted
more establishment oriented models of pay determination, 53 to which
I now turn.
C. Establishment Oriented
This view of pay determination emphasizes the job to be performed
rather than the general qualifications of individual employees.54 The
pay of employees is dependent upon the jobs they hold; secondary de-
terminants are their job tenure and quality of job performance.
In this view, human capital such as schooling and work experience
are not rewarded directly, but are compensated only to the extent that
the more demanding jobs in an establishment tend to be the better
paid jobs and are usually held by employees with relatively large
amounts of schooling and experience. Schooling and pay levels of em-
ployees in an establishment will ordinarily be correlated, but the rela-
tionship may not be a close one.5 5
Establishment oriented pay models derive from the mechanics of
establishment pay setting. The salary or wage attached to any particu-
lar job is given by the market salary required to hire people into the
job; or by the employer's assessment of the relative worth of the job, in
terms of its importance to the establishment and its requirements (for
example, skill, effort, and responsibility); or, most likely, by some
combination of both methods. Most medium and large sized firms will
have a system of job evaluation or classification that assesses the com-
parative worth of its jobs and sets pay accordingly. Nonetheless, mar-
ket prices may alter the salaries of some jobs that have been
established through job evaluation, or may influence the initial evalu-
51. E.g., Melani v. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y., 561 F. Supp. 769
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Mecklenburg v. Montana State Bd. of Regents, 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 462 (D. Mont. 1976).
52. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 51.
53. Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 556 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Pouncy v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp 427 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.
1982).
54. The establishment oriented view of pay determination emphasizes the demand
for labor, while the human capital approach emphasizes its supply.
55. See e.g., Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F. Supp. 917, 956 (D.D.C.
1981).
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ations themselves.56 Similarly, firms that claim to have pay systems
geared strictly to the market are, nonetheless, likely to be slow to al-
ter traditional establishment pay relationships because of changes in
market wages. Thus, employee pay rates are likely to be the product
of both market forces and equity considerations. This is also true
where pay rates are established through a collective bargaining
process.
Precisely how the salaries for an establishment's jobs are set is not
important to the establishment model of pay determination that is
used for assessing discrimination. The important facts are that pay
rates are attached to all jobs, and that these job pay rates determine
what the individual job-holder is paid, except for variation due to the
employee's length of service and perceived job performance. In larger
firms, jobs with similar pay rates or similar job evaluation scores will
be grouped into a job level or pay grade, for which a standard base pay
rate and range is established. Then in the establishment oriented
view, pay regressions that purport to explain employee pay must in-
clude a job level variable.
The social science (but not necessarily legal) problem with this for-
mulation of pay is that it may not explain individual pay except tauto-
logically. Saying that employees pay is determined by the job levels at
which they are employed is correct, but it can be argued that the state-
ment says very little because it does not disclose how the level, and
thus pay, of a job is determined.57 Employers can contend that the
level and associated salary of a job are based on the productivity con-
tributions to the establishment that are made through the job, but un-
less the particular productivity elements and their contributions are
shown, this rationale must be accepted on faith.
This objection may be met where jobs have been formally evalu-
ated. A pay regression with job evaluation points as a variable is an
attempt to explain pay in terms of evaluation factors that have both a
productivity and equity base; typically, skill, effort, responsibiity, and
working conditions. Such a regression was well received by the court
in Vuyanich vs. Republic National Bank of Dallas.5 8 However, if the
job evaluations have been influenced by market considerations (as I
suggested above), this means that, to some degree, the salaries that the
market requires, in order to hire people for the establishment's vari-
ous jobs, are actually determining the evaluation points of the jobs em-
ployees hold.59 The regression will then be defective in the sense that
56. See W. FOGEL, supra note 5, at 111.
57. See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp. 314, 324 n.3(b)
(W.D.N.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 628 F. 2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980).
58. 505 F. Supp. 224, 284 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
59. Causation runs from salary paid to job evaluation points, rather than the reverse.
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the explanatory contributions of the job evaluation variable will be
exaggerated.
A somewhat analogous argument can be made against job level
variables generally. If the level (and pay) at which jobs are placed
depends upon whether they are perceived as a "male" or "female" job,
then sex is the more fundamental determinant of salary, and a job
level variable will obscure that fact in a regression equation-it will
lower the negative pay coefficient of sex due to its correlation with
both pay and sex.
In addition to a job level variable, establishment oriented pay re-
gressions will often include a job tenure variable because employers
generally increase pay with tenure, and a job productivity or perform-
ance variable on the grounds that the employer both wants to and does
reward superior job performance. Of course, many regression models
contain a mixture of establishment and human capital variables. In
this Article my distinction between the two general models turns on
the treatment of the job level variable. A regression that includes it is
establishment oriented; one that does not is a human capital
regression.6 0
Establishment oriented regressions usually account for a large part
of the variation in employee pay-over 90 percent in one instance 6 '-
and do not show a statistically significant sex effect on pay. In con-
trast human capital regressions usually explain a much smaller pro-
portion of establishment pay variation, and do produce a statistically
significant sex effect. The difference is that the low pay of women
cannot be accounted for by sexual differences in general qualifications
(human capital), but can be accounted for by a job level variable.
V. PAY REGRESSIONS AS PROOF
It is evident that neither the human capital nor establishment ori-
ented regressions provide a fully satisfactory explanation of pay differ-
ences within establishments. The former omits specific establishment
influences, while the latter often provides little more than a tautologi-
cal understanding. A court is not a social science laboratory, however.
When these two approaches to pay determination are considered
within the law of Title VII, it becomes clear that the establishment
approach is useful for detecting the existence of pay discrimination
and the human capital approach is not. This conclusion derives from
my views that claims founded on comparisons among unequal jobs,
whether analyzed by means of multiple regression or not, are not al-
60. A model that does not fall within these two categories, because it includes many
establishment variables but not a job level variable, was submitted by the defend-
ant in Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 300 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
61. Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp. 427, 450 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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lowable under Title VII, while claims of discriminatory treatment
within job levels are permitted. Establishment oriented regressions
provide evidence about the latter, allowable claim, while human capi-
tal regressions do not.
A. Human Capital Proofs
Multiple regressions based on a human capital model of pay deter-
mination-one that excludes a job level variable-will invariably find
discrimination against women,62 by means of a statistically significant
sex coefficient that shows women receiving lower pay than men after
controlling for the effects of the other variables in the regression-
usually years of schooling and experience, and variants thereof. There
are two reasons why this result should not be accepted as evidence of
pay discrimination.
First, the result is obtained through comparison of salaries paid to
employees for performing unequal jobs, and this is a form of compara-
ble worth comparison that is not authorized under Title VII. The sala-
ries received by individual employees who hold unequal jobs
throughout the establishment are the focus (dependent variable) of
the regression analysis. Since the human capital regression does not
include job level among its explanatory variables, different salaries for
unequal jobs remain the focus throughout the analysis, regardless of
how many measures of employee qualifications are entered as explan-
atory variables for existing pay differences.
Second, a regression that does not include a job level variable is
implicitly judging the comparative worth of the establishment's une-
qual jobs. The human capital regression, in effect, states that the
"proper" difference between the average pay (earnings) of male and
female employees (and the differences among all employees) is that
which can be accounted for by sexual differences in schooling and ex-
perience. Invariably, the actual pay difference between the sexes is
greater than this prescribed difference because women tend to hold
low paid jobs relative to their schooling and experience. Thus, with a
human capital regression there emerges an "improper" margin of
male over female average earnings. The regression, because it does
not include a job level variable, attributes this margin to sex. Since
the "improper" margin comes about through low pay for many of the
jobs held by women, attributing it to sex-an unlawful basis-rather
than to the low wage rates (by means of a job level variable) implicitly
finds that the low wage rates, themselves, are unlawful: they are too
low for the schooling and experience of the female employees. That
comparative worth judgment is not authorized under Title VII.
It can be seen that even if pay comparisons among employees hold-
62. See infra Table 1.
[Vol. 65:289
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PROOFS
ing unequal jobs were permitted by Title VII, the human capital re-
gression model would still be inconsistent with it. This is because the
model is normative rather than descriptive of the employer's pay
scheme. 63 The model says that employers should base employee pay
on years of schooling and experience, and then, when it turns out that
employers do not do this very closely because they base pay on other
considerations as well, the model proceeds to produce a negative asso-
ciation between being female and pay. If, somehow, Title VII were to
permit comparative worth judgments, they would have to be based
upon whether the establishment is sexually neutral in following its
own pay determinants, not upon whether external criteria, even if so-
cially praiseworthy, are adhered to.
B. Ambiguity of Human Capital Regressions
An additional problem of human capital regressions is that their
interpretation is necessarily ambiguous because the sex coefficient
produced by these regressions incorporates all three of the sources of
sexual salary differences described at the outset of this Article: job
distribution differences, job pay differentials, and disparate treatment
within job levels. Given this fact, it is not surprising that courts that
have received evidence from human capital regressions sometimes ap-
pear to be uncertain as to the particular discrimination claim that the
regressions are probative of.64
One possible interpretation of the sex coefficient in human capital
regressions is that it is evidence of discriminatory pay differentials
among an establishment's jobs. But, as indicated throughout this Arti-
cle, court acceptance of that interpretation, in the absence of direct
evidence of intent to discriminate, is unlikely because that interpreta-
tion credits a conclusion (statistical) about the pay relationships
among unequal jobs (that they are based on sex rather than the
human capital of jobholders) and, therefore, appears to go beyond the
prohibitions of Title VII.
A more likely interpretation of the sex coefficient is that it is indic-
ative of discrimination against women in job allocation. However, that
makes the plaintiff's claim one of discrimination in job allocation
rather than pay. Furthermore, even as evidence of discrimination in
job allocation, the sex coefficient in a human capital regression has
63. Cf. Cox, Equal Work, Comparable Worth and Disparate Treatment: An Argu-
ment for Narrowly Construing County of Washington v. Gunther, 22 DUQ. L.
REV. 65, 88, 128, 137 (1983).
64. See, e.g., Melani v. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y., 561 F. Supp. 769
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873 (D.D.C. 1981), modified sub.
nom. Trout v. Lehmann, 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 1404
(1984); Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981), affd sub nom Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Mich., 495
F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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limitations: a) the coefficient includes the pay effects of discrimina-
tory treatment within job levels, as well as the pay effects of discrimi-
nation in job allocation; b) as a standard for job allocation, the human
capital model carries the same defects that it has as a model for pay
determination-Title VII does not require employers to allocate jobs
among employees on the basis of their years of schooling and experi-
ence; and c) direct evidence, regression or otherwise, which gets at the
placement and promotion processes, would seem to be a better proof
of discrimination in job allocation than a human capital salary regres-
sion.65 For all of these reasons, human capital regressions appear to
offer only secondary, suggestive evidence of discrimination in job allo-
cation. They are, nonetheless, frequently used to make out a prima
facie case of such discrimination.
It can be argued that I am being unnecessarily complex; that
human capital pay regressions carry no discriminatory implications
about pay differentials among unequal jobs, but simply show, after
certain general employee qualifications are taken into account, that
women are not paid as much as they are worth relative to men, and
this constitutes pay discrimination. But this assertion amounts to an
unusual form of a comparable worth claim, where the focus is shifted
from the relative worth of jobs to the relative worth of employees.
Title VII does not, however, authorize judgments about the relative
worth of employees in pay terms any more than it authorizes judg-
ments about the relative worth of jobs. 66
In sum, human capital regressions submitted in support of estab-
lishment-wide pay claims are improper evidence because they involve
comparisons of pay for employees who hold different jobs, and that is
apparently unauthorized by Title VII. The fact that the regression
comparisons take into account employee differences in general labor
market qualifications does not negate the fact that the existing sex
difference in pay results from salary differences among the establish-
ment's jobs. The counter assertion that the sexual pay difference re-
sults from the concentration of females in low paid jobs, beyond the
extent explicable by sexual differences in general qualifications, is
equally correct, but that is a claim of discrimination in job allocation,
not pay.
Why some courts have permitted pay comparisons among employ-
ees who hold different jobs, under the guise of multiple regression
analysis, is not apparent. One reason may be that multiple regression
65. Regressions to explain job assignment were submitted in two cases: Melani v.
Board of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y., 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and
Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Mich., 495 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. (1980).
66. Cf. Becker, Comparable Worth in Antidiscrimination Legislation: A Reply to
Freed and Polsby, 51 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1112, 1131 (1984) (legislative history of
Equal Pay Act indicates that Congress rejected a standard based on comparable
worth).
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is a fairly complex method of analysis and some courts have failed to
see that, when it is employed with human capital models, its implica-
tions for pay discrimination arise from the pay differentials that exist
among an establishment's jobs. Another reason may be that courts
view the human capital regressions as offering nothing more than evi-
dence of placement and promotion discrimination. Some courts have
made this view clear,67 but others have found defendants guilty of pay
discrimination based on human capital regressions.68 These different
interpretations have produced confusion about what constitutes pay
discrimination. 69
C. Establishment Oriented Proofs
The basic fact about establishment oriented pay regressions is that
they include a job level variable, and therefore confine their analyses
of class pay discrimination to that which can take place within the job
levels of an establishment. Thus, they are consistent with Title VII in
that they do not incorporate judgments about the proper bases for pay
differentials among different jobs in an establishment, but rather ac-
cept the existing job differentials as beyond inquiry (absent direct evi-
dence that they are based on sex). In contrast, human capital
regressions, because they do not include a job level variable, make im-
proper judgments that employee (and job) pay differences should be
based upon schooling and work experience.
Establishment oriented regressions provide only limited under-
standing of employee pay differences within an entire establishment
for the reasons previously discussed: the job level variable may be
only loosely connected to productivity; job level may be salary deter-
mined as well as salary determining; and sex may influence job level.
Thus, the high degree of "explanation" of establishment pay variation
achieved by some establishment regressions is partly tautological.
However, that fact has no relevance for any cognizable pay claim be-
cause Title VII does not authorize claims that require court judgment
about the proper bases for employee or job pay differences (compara-
ble worth judgments). For that reason, I concluded in the previous
section that the human capital regression analyses that have been
used in some instances to establish a prima facie case of pay discrimi-
nation are inconsistent with Title VII law. If this is correct, the failure
of establishment oriented regressions to satisfactorily rebut human
67. E.g., James v. Stockham Valve & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 334 (5th Cir. 1977);
Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873, 879 n.14 (D.D.C. 1981).
68. E.g., Melani v. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y., 561 F. Supp. 769, 775
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Mich., 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1063
(E.D. Mich. 1980).
69. Note, Title VII, Multiple Linear Regression Models and the Courts: An Analysis,
46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 283, 291-92 (1983).
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capital explanations of pay differences among employees in unequal
jobs is unimportant; if such claims are not allowed, there is no need for
their rebuttal.
Claims of pay discrimination within job levels are allowable, how-
ever, and establishment oriented regressions, because they include a
job level variable, are useful for detecting this kind of discrimination.
When job level is controlled and the regression includes the non-
discriminatory variables that determine within-level pay, the coeffi-
cient of the sex variable will be a measure of pay discrimination
against women, effectuated by their disparate treatment within job
levels, presumably in terms of initial placement and subsequent pro-
gression through the salary range.
A variety of establishment oriented regression models can be used
to detect within-level pay discrimination, as long as a variable that
controls for job level is included. The variables may be taken from the
establishment's own pay system, for example, job tenure and perform-
ance rating.70 Or they may be more remote, and include such factors
as years of schooling, if this variable is thought to influence salary suc-
cess through employee job performance.7 1
A performance evaluation variable in a regression poses a dilemma
for the courts. On the one hand, establishments want to encourage
high performance and, therefore, may make movement through a sal-
ary range partially or totally dependent upon performance evalua-
tions. In such cases, performance evaluations are likely to explain a
great deal of the pay differences that exist within job levels. On the
other hand, if an establishment discriminates against women, that dis-
crimination is likely to affect evaluations of their performance, and
inclusion of this variable in a pay regression would be improper. Some
courts seem to decide this issue based on a gestalt view of the establish-
ment. If discrimination is found in hiring, assignment, promotion, and
other areas, it may be correct to exclude performance ratings from pay
regressions on the ground that they, also, have been influenced by dis-
crimination.72 Other courts have apparently excluded performance
evaluations, not because inferential evidence of their bias exists, but
simply because they are subjective.73 Most performance appraisals are
necessarily subjective, in the sense that they represent judgment by a
supervisor of a subordinate's unmeasurable job performance. That
does not necessarily make them biased against a protected class. Judg-
ments to that effect, without substantiating evidence, are unjustified
70. See, e.g., James v. Stockham Valve & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 332 (5th Cir. 1977).
71. See e.g., EEOC v. IBM Corp., 583 F. Supp. 875, 899 (D. Md. 1984).
72. See Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Michigan, 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1064 (E.D.
Mich. 1980).
73. James v. Stockham Valve & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 332 (5th Cir. 1977); Segar v.
Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 697, 712 (D.D.C. 1981); Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp. 314, 330-31 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
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and can amount to convicting a defendant of pay (or promotion) dis-
crimination through an assumption of discrimination in performance
evaluations.74
D. Value of Regressions
I have concluded that neither human capital nor establishment ori-
ented regressions provide fully satisfactory explanations of average
pay differences between the sexes within entire establishments. A
model that combines general labor market qualifications with reliable
indicators of employee contributions to the establishment is needed
for this purpose,7 5 but the latter is frequently not available.
The absence of a satisfactory pay model does no damage to enforce-
ment of statutory prohibitions on pay discrimination. First, the mean-
ing of establishment-wide pay discrimination is not clear; often it
appears to be another term for discrimination in the allocation of jobs,
for which rather clear proofs exist. Second, to the extent that estab-
lishment-wide pay discrimination refers to the comparative worth and
pay rates of dissimilar jobs, it refers to inquiry that is not authorized
by Title VII or any other statute.
There are still functions for regression analyses. They can be use-
ful to detect discrimination within job levels, either by including a job
level variable in an establishment-wide regression or by running sepa-
rate regressions for each job level. Human capital regressions can also
be used to help make a statistical prima facie case of job allocation
discrimination and to compute the pay losses of women because of that
discrimination.
Acceptance of these views by the courts would simplify their tasks
in pay cases. Human capital regressiors would be viewed as providing
evidence only for job assignment and promotion charges. Pay claims
would require evidence from establishment oriented regressions that
control for job level (or nonregression evidence). Among other things,
this distinction would clarify the nature of class pay discrimination.
VI. COURT RESOLUTION OF THE JOB LEVEL ISSUE
The most important issue that courts face when regressions are
submitted in salary discrimination litigation is whether a job level va-
74. Cf. Becker, supra note 66, at 1130 (alleging that if performance differences exist
between the sexes, absent discrimination, a rule excluding subjective "proxies"
may be equivalent to a rule that plaintiff prevails); Cox, supra note 63, at 136, 139
n.242, 144; Freed & Polsby, Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1078, 1108 (1984) (inadmissibility of subjective performance evaluations
puts defendant into a position of not being able to use any performance factors to
rebut plaintiff's allegations of discrimination established by salary differentials).
75. See, for example, the defense's regression in Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of
Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 300 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
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riable should or should not be included in the regression equation.
The issue is crucial, also, for a correct application of pay discrimination
law because, as I have argued throughout this Article, a proper pay
discrimination charge or defense requires inclusion of a job level vari-
able in regression evidence. A regression that does not include this
variable does not provide evidence about pay discrimination, although
it may be deemed probative of discrimination in job allocation.
A. Job Level and Case Outcomes
Typically in class pay claims, the plaintiff presents a human capital
pay regression that does not include a job level variable, and the de-
fendant counters with an establishment oriented regression that in-
cludes some form of that variable. The court must then decide which
regression is more probative. Occasionally, only one side submits a
regression, but the court must still face the job level issue.76
Table 1 presents information about seventeen pay discrimination
cases in which the trial court (circuit court in three instances) opinion
discusses both the issues and results that accompanied the submission
of salary regression evidence. (Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank
of Dallas is listed twice-it made separate pay discrimination decisions
based on sex and race.) Nearly all of the cases listed in Table 1 encom-
passed a broad array of discrimination charges, including that of dis-
crimination in job allocation. While compensation discrimination was
included among the charges filed by the plaintiffs in all of these cases,
the courts did not always decide the compensation issue. In two in-
stances, the courts made no finding on the compensation question and
appear to have considered the salary regression solely as evidence of
discrimination in job allocation. 77 In other instances, findings were is-
sued on the compensation charge, but it is not clear that, in the pro-
cess, a distinction was made between discrimination in pay and in job
allocation.78 A merging of these two kinds of discrimination is more
76. E.g., Agarwal v. McKee & Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 503 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
77. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977); Trout v.
Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873 (D.D.C. 1981), affd sub. nom. Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d
1904 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 1404 (1984).
78. E.g., Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981), affd sub nom Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Mecklenburg v. Montana State Bd. of Re-
gents, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 462 (D. Mont. 1976).
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TABLE 1. COURT DECISIONS IN PAY REGRESSION CASES
Statistically
significant
Job level discrimination Discrimination
variable coefficient in in job
credited credited allocation
or required regression? found?
A. Decisions Finding Pay Discrimination
1. Craik v. Minnesota State
University Board 7 9  no yes yes
2. Greenspan v. Automobile
Club of Michigan8 0  no yes yes
3. James v. Stockham Valve & no reg.
Fitting CO. 8 1  no credited yes
4. Mecklenburg v. Montana
State Board of Regents82  no yes yes
5. Melani v. Board of
Education of the City of no yes informally
New York 8 3
6. Segar v. Civiletti8 4  no yes yes
7. Trout v. Hidalgo8 5  no yes yes
8. Vuyanich v. Republic
National Bank of Dallas yes yes yes
(race) 8 6
79. 731 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984).
80. 495 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
81. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977). The court did not make a finding of pay
discrimination independent of the finding of discrimination in job allocation.
82. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 462 (D. Mont. 1976).
83. 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
84. 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981), affd sub nom Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
85. 517 F. Supp. 873 (D.D.C. 1981), affd sub nom Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094
(D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 1404 (1984). The trial court did
not make a finding of pay discrimination independent of the finding of
discrimination in job allocation.
86. 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th
Cir. 1984).
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TABLE I (continued)
Job level
variable
credited
or required
B. Decisions Not Finding Pay Discrimination
9. Agarwal v. McKee & Co.
8 7
10. Coser v. Moore (SUNY) 88
11. EEOC v. IBM Corp.
8 9
12. Pouncy v. Prudential
Insurance Company of
America9 0
13. Presseisen v. Swarthmore
College9 1
14. Sobel v. Yeshiva
University9 2
15. Valentino v. United States
Postal Service9 3
16. Vuyanich v. Republic
National Bank of Dallas
(sex)9 4
17. Wilkins v. University of
Houston 9 5
Statistically
significant
discrimination
coefficient in
credited
regression?
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Discrimination
in job
allocation
found?
no reg.yes credited
yes no
yes no
no reg.yes credited
87. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 503 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
88. 587 F. Supp. 572 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984).
89. 583 F. Supp. 875 (D. Md. 1984).
90. 449 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
91. 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978).
92. 566 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
93. 511 F. Supp. 917 (D.D.C. 1981), affd, 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
94. 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th
Cir. 1984).
95. 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 662 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
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evident in the decisions that found pay discrimination than in those
that did not. In the former, human capital regressions that produced
significant sex coefficients were the basis for the findings of salary dis-
crimination, but it is not clear that the salary discrimination was seen
as something more than a discriminatory allocation of jobs.
It is clear from Table 1 that a judgment for inclusion of a job level
variable in the regression analysis is almost perfectly correlated with a
finding for the defendant on the pay discrimination issue; a job level
variable was credited in all nine of the findings that pay discrimination
was not shown (Part B, column 1). Conversely, in only one of the deci-
sions that found pay discrimination was a job level variable credited
(Part A, column 1). The direct effect of the job level variable on re-
gression statistics is readily observed in the Table. Where the job level
variable was included, the credited regression did not produce a statis-
tically significant sex coefficient, with one exception (Part B, column
2). Where the credited regression excluded the job level variable, a
discriminatory sex coefficient was produced (Part A, column 2). Table
1 also shows that a court finding for or against pay discrimination is
nearly always accompanied by the same finding with respect to dis-
crimination in job allocation. (column 3).
Clearly, the decision on whether job level should be included in the
pay regression analysis controls the outcome of the analysis and, con-
sequently, the outcome of the pay discrimination charge. The exclu-
sion of this variable disqualifies the major explanation for sexual
salary differences within establishments--differences in level of job
held. With job level excluded, sex is certain to be important in ex-
plaining pay wherever women are concentrated in low salary jobs. In
other words, women are underrepresented in high salary jobs and the
consequent establishment average salary difference between men and
women cannot be explained by human capital variables-male and fe-
male employees don't differ that much in regard to quantities of
schooling and experience. Therefore, a regression that includes
human capital variables, but not job level, will produce a significant
sex coefficient because of the negative correlation that exists between
sex and the omitted variable, job level. When a job level variable is
included, it will explain most of the male-female salary difference so
that little or no independent sex effect will be found.
Valentino v. United States Postal Service,96 illustrates the effect of
a job level variable on regression results. The plaintiff's regression
included only years of government service, years of schooling, and sex.
The sex coefficient was significantly negative for females, but the re-
gression accounted for only 28 percent of the existing variation in em-
ployee salaries. The defense's regression included job level, among
other variables, and accounted for 88 percent of salary variation; the
sex coefficient was not significant.
96. 511 F. Supp. 917 (D.D.C. 1981), affrd, 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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B. The Job Level Rationale
Courts that have rejected inclusion of a job level variable in a sal-
ary regression have done so on two grounds. The first is that the es-
tablishment's initial assignment and subsequent promotion of women
are discriminatory. Thus, in Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Michi-
gan,97 the court gave little weight to defendant regressions conducted
within salary grades (this procedure is equivalent to that of using a job
level variable in an establishment-wide regression) after the plaintiffs
had shown that, if job assignment had been based on human capital
characteristics, 67 percent of the female employees would have been
in high salary grades, compared to the actual figure of 12 percent.9 8
The second ground used to exclude a job level variable is that job
placement and promotion are subject to the control of the employer,
and therefore may be "tainted" with discrimination. In Trout v. Hi-
dalgo,99 the court rejected a defendant's regression that included
grade-level-when-hired as an explanatory variable, and noted: "It is
commonly accepted that it is inappropriate to include as an independ-
ent variable a factor within defendant's control unless it has been es-
tablished that they did not discriminate in exercising that control."100
These rationales for exclusion of job level are not cogent, because
whether that variable should be included in a regression depends en-
tirely upon the discrimination claim that is made. If the claim is dis-
crimination in job allocation, the assignment of men and women to job
levels is at issue and a job level variable cannot, therefore, be included
in a regression designed to determine whether male-female salary dif-
ferences are suggestive of discriminatory job placement and promo-
tion. On the other hand, if the issue is pay discrimination, a job level
variable must be included in the regression in order to control for the
pay influence of that variable and, thus, focus the regression on a cog-
nizable claim: disparate pay treatment within job levels. It makes no
difference for pay claims that assignment of employees to job levels is
or may be discriminatory; the focus of the pay claim must be on dispa-
rate class treatment within job levels, and a regression that includes
the job level variable achieves that focus even if women are discrimi-
nated against in job assignment.
Nearly all of the reported cases fail to recognize that it is the na-
ture of the discrimination claim that must determine whether a
97. 495 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
98. Id. at 1063.
99. 517 F. Supp. 873 (D.D.C. 1981), affd sub nom Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094
(D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 1404 (1984). The Court di-
rected the trial court, on remand, to view the evidence in light of the D.C. Cir-
cuit's ruling that the defendant was not responsible for discriminatory initial
placements.
100. Id. at 886 n.47.
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human capital or establishment oriented regression is more proba-
tive.101 Even most rulings that have credited the inclusion of a job
level variable in a pay regression have been made on the irrelevant
ground that employee pay differences within an establishment are
partly due to job level differences. Establishment-wide employee pay
differences are not a proper focus of a pay claim, except as described
earlier (where there is direct evidence that the underlying job pay dif-
ferences were established on the basis of sex). This exception aside, a
regression with a job level variable must be used for a pay claim in
order to confine the claim to discrimination within job levels, not to
contribute to the explanation of establishment-wide pay differences.
In this sense, it is unimportant whether the model of establishment-
wide pay determination is sound; there is no reason to "explain" estab-
lishment-wide pay.
C. University Cases
Seven of the cases listed in Table 1 were brought against universi-
ties.102 Evidence relative to the pay claim in each focused on salary
regressions with and without a job level variable, referred to as "rank"
in universities. Since it has been generally found that different ranks,
e.g., assistant and associate professor, do not encompass equal work,
the pay issue in each of the university cases was the same as that in
proprietary cases: what kind of regression, human capital or establish-
ment oriented, is appropriate for analyzing pay discrimination? The
difference between the university and proprietary job-pay struc-
tures-that rank differences in the former are more directly associ-
ated with putative productivity than are job level differences in the
latter-provides, perhaps, greater justification for inclusion of the job
level variable in university pay regressions, but the controlling justifi-
cation for this variable in either case is that pay claims are ordinarily
restricted to within job levels.
In three of the listed university cases, however, the courts rejected
regressions that included rank on the ground that the university de-
fendants had discriminated against women in promotion to the higher
ranks; all three cases resulted in findings of pay discrimination based
on the sex coefficients in human capital regressions. 03 In my view,
the human capital regressions in these cases supplied only suggestive
evidence of discrimination in promotion, and the rejection of regres-
101. An exception is Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 284
(S.D. Tex. 1980).
102. The Table 1 identification numbers for these cases are: 1, 4, 5, 10, 13, 14, and 17.
103. Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984); Melani v. Board
of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y., 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Mecklen-
burg v. Montana State Bd. of Regents, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 462 (D.
Mont. 1976).
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
sions with a rank variable prevented the courts from even considering
the proper pay claims: whether there was pay discrimination against
women within ranks. That claim should have been examined inde-
pendently of whether women were treated unfairly in promotions.
The adjudicatory effects of rulings on the rank variable are illus-
trated by contrasting two recently decided university cases in which
the evidence considered was largely from multiple regression analy-
ses. In Melani v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New
York,10 4 the plaintiffs' regressions did not include faculty rank; they
produced negative sex coefficients of $500 to $1800 of annual salary for
females and a judgment of sex-based pay discrimination.O5 The court
rejected the defense's regression, which included rank, based on a
showing by the plaintiff that women were overrepresented among in-
structors and underrepresented among full and associate
professors.1 06
In Sobel v. Yeshiva University,1 0 7 the plaintiffs withdrew their
claims of discrimination in the promotion of women to the various uni-
versity ranks.108 The court then credited the defendant's regression
that included a rank variable as an indicator of employee productivity
(in lieu of more direct measures of productivity that the court would
have preferred.) 109 Although the decision to credit a regression that
included rank was correct, the ground for doing so-that rank is a pro-
ductivity determinant of pay-was not. Rank had to be included, not
to improve the pay model, but to hold constant the effect of rank on
pay so that the pay analysis was confined to within ranks. Inclusion of
the rank variable reduced the sex coefficients in the plaintiff's regres-
sions to statistically insignificant levels, and the court found for the
defendant.
Although sex-based pay discrimination was found in Melani and
not in Sobel, the evidentiary difference in the two cases was essentially
that there may have been job assignment discrimination in the former
but not the latter. Women were disproportionately employed in the
lower academic ranks in both instances. In Melani, the court evi-
dently regarded this as evidence of promotion discrimination (but no
formal judgment to that effect was made)11o and proceeded to find pay
discrimination. In Sobel the plaintiffs dropped the promotion discrim-
ination charge and the court found no pay discrimination. The differ-
ing results of these two cases may or may not have been capricious, but
104. 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
105. Id. at 775.
106. Id. at 783.
107. 566 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
108. Id. at 1180 n.36.
109. Id. at 1180.
110. The trial was limited to salary discrimination claims. Melani v. Board of Higher
Educ. of the City of N.Y., 561 F. Supp. 769, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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if women were treated differently in the two universities, it was
through job placement and promotion, not pay discrimination.
The Melani and Sobel decisions turned on judgments about the
kinds of regressions that were appropriate: the human capital regres-
sion preferred by the Melani court could not possibly have accounted
for the job allocation based difference in male and female average sal-
aries; the Sobel court's judgment for a regression that controlled job
level substantially reduced the plaintiff's chances of finding sex dis-
crimination in pay. The finding of discrimination in pay was effec-
tively made when the Melani court ruled that, due to discrimination
in job allocation, a job level variable could not be included in the pay
regression; the Melani court then credited regression evidence of dis-
crimination in job allocation to find pay discrimination. Whether a
finding of discrimination in job allocation rather than pay in Melani
would have produced different remedial consequences may be doubt-
ful; nonetheless the adjudication process is inevitably weakened by
misalignment of claims and proofs.
VII. COURT TREATMENT OF OTHER REGRESSION ISSUES
A. Performance Appraisals
Satisfactory employee productivity is ordinarily a requirement for
the continued success of business and, presumably, government estab-
lishments. Then it follows that employers will attempt to set up pay
systems that encourage high employee productivity, by basing pay at
least partly on employee output and other aspects of job performance.
However, relatively few jobs lend themselves to a direct incentive sys-
tem where pay can be varied directly with measured output (a piece
rate or commission system). Consequently, most employers try to tie
pay to productivity through job performance appraisals (evaluations),
whereby supervisors judge the performance of their subordinates.
Human nature being what it is, these systems never work perfectly,
and sometimes work poorly. No doubt, systemmatic bias based on sex
or race is sometimes present in the evaluation process. Yet, it should
be remembered that the raison d'etre for an evaluation system is the
achievement of high job performance by employees to maintain or in-
crease establishment productivity. To the extent that bias enters the
system, achievement of these objectives is weakened. Therefore, if
any assumption is appropriate about the value of performance apprais-
als for explaining pay variation, it is that appraisals contribute to such
explanation, rather than the assumption that they do not.
Several courts, however, have made the latter assumption, re-
jecting or discrediting the use of performance evaluations in regres-
sion or other kinds of analyses of pay discrimination.-1 In Stastny v.
111. See supra note 73.
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Southern Bell Telephone Company,1 12 the trial court discredited the
defendant's appraisal system with the conclusion that "[T]he opera-
tion of an opinion-based appraisal system, largely controlled by one
sex, such as the one at Southern Bell, provides an ideal environment
for disparate treatment of sexes."113 This court went on to find that
the higher appraisal ratings received by men than women in the de-
fendant firm constituted evidence that disparate treatment did, in-
deed, exist.
Perhaps the court's conclusions are consistent with a broad inter-
pretation of disparate impact doctrine that would require the em-
ployer to show the validity of appraisals used for pay determination
and promotions. 114 But where employee job performance cannot be
measured, so that only judgments of performance are possible, it is not
apparent that the validity of the appraisal judgments can be estab-
lished. Then, according to the Stastny court, appraisals that produce
different performance ratings between the sexes are discriminatory.
That reasoning can invalidate one of the most important determi-
nants of pay within an establishment, one that is especially important
to pay variation within job levels, and, consequently, can produce a
finding of sex discrimination in pay where none exists. To find de-
fendants guilty of pay discrimination because they cannot prove the
validity of a major determinant of pay, when there is no known
method for doing so, places a harsh burden of proof on defendants,
essentially requiring them to prove their innocence.11 5
112. 458 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.
1980).
113. Id. at 331.
114. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (employment or
promotion tests and criteria must have a meaningful relationship to job perform-
ance ability).
115. The majority opinion in a recent case, Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524
(7th Cir. 1985), attempted clarification of this matter:
[We think that once a defendant offers statistics using an allegedly bi-
ased factor [explanatory variable] the plaintiff must bear the burden of
persuading the factfinder that the factor is biased. Placing the burden on
the defendant . . .would be inconsistent with the principle that the
plaintiffs in a Title VII case retain the ultimate burden of persuasion on
the issue of discrimination.
Id. at 544. The concurring opinion disagreed with these conclusions:
In the ordinary course of things, the defendant should not be allowed to
appeal to a factor within his control as an explanation unless he can
show that it is not biased, and a complete lack of evidence either way
should ordinarily work to the detriment of the defendant and not the
plaintiff.
Id. at 555 (Cudahy, D.J., concurring).
The latter view seems to assert, as a matter of law, that, for example, where
job performance can be assessed only subjectively, the average job performances
of men and women must be assumed to be equal and, therefore, unconnected to
sexual pay differences. Then sexual pay differences that correspond to sexual
[Vol. 65:289
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As mentioned earlier, a gestalt view of whether the employer is
discriminating against a class of employees may govern court decisions
about the value of performance evaluations for explaining pay. Thus,
in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. International
Business Machines Corporation,116 where the court dismissed all dis-
crimination charges, it found IBM's subjective performance evaluation
system to be nondiscriminatory despite the fact that blacks consist-
ently received lower ratings than whites. 17 On the other hand, sev-
eral cases where discrimination charges were generally upheld have
rejected the use of performance evaluations to explain salary differ-
ences (in regressions or otherwise) on the ground that the evaluations
were subjective and subject to manipulation by the employer.1s Per-
haps the courts are making sound intuitive decisions when they reject
the use of appraisals for salary analyses, but the statutory or logical
bases for these decisions are not apparent.
B. Other Productivity Variables
Courts differ markedly in their regard for establishment oriented
productivity variables in pay regressions. One trial court criticized
both the plaintiff's and defendant's regressions for failure to include
many factors that affect salaries "such as quality of experience and
education, job performance, leadership, skill, and effort."119 On the
other hand, Melani rejected productivity variables for academics-
quality of teaching, quantity and quality of publications, and commu-
nity service-because of concern that these variables could incorpo-
rate the effects of discriminatory decisions rather than provide
independent measures of productivity.120
Another trial court made explicit a wrong understanding of regres-
sion proofs that appears to be shared with other courts. In Segar v.
Civiletti the court stated: "Plaintiffs cannot be expected to include all
possible variables in their regression analyses. Rather, only those
variables that are both objective in nature and quantifiable need be
included."121 This conclusion is wrong even if an establishment-wide
(across job levels) focus for the analysis of pay differentials is accepted
as proper. It is absurd and beyond the law to require employers to
differences in job performance assessments would be per se discriminatory! I do
agree with another view expressed in this concurring opinion-that common
sense and the totality of evidence must be considered in deciding whether reli-
ance on an allegedly biased variable is proper.
116. 583 F. Supp. 875 (D. Md. 1984).
117. Id. at 906.
118. See supra note 73.
119. Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 511 F. Supp. 917, 957 (D.D.C. 1981).
120. Melani v. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of N.Y., 561 F. Supp. 769, 778
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
121. 508 F. Supp. 690, 696 n.2 (D.D.C. 1981).
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explain their class pay differences with the objective and quantifiable,
general labor market variables of years of schooling and experience,
and to find them guilty of pay discrimination when they cannot do so.
Pay for job performance is both desirable and necessary for the eco-
nomic success of enterprises; performance assessment necessarily re-
quires subjective and nonquantifiable judgments.
C. The Amount of Pay Variation Explained
The courts have generally concluded that the proportion of em-
ployee pay variation explained by a regression model (designated as
"R 2") is unimportant.122 This is not an entirely accurate view. While
it is true that a complete explanation of pay differences is not neces-
sary to determine whether sex or race has an effect, 12 3 it is also true
that the greater the explanatory power of the model, the more confi-
dent one can be that the apparent influence of sex or race on pay is
also a true influence. When a regression model explains just a small
proportion of pay variation it is very possible that there exist unob-
served variables that are correlated with both pay and sex, because so
much of pay variation remains unexplained. Then the apparent influ-
ence of sex on pay may be false because it is brought about by the
correlation between sex and the true, but not observed, influence on
pay. As R 2, the explained variation in pay, increases, the chances of a
spurious correlation between sex and pay declines.
The opposite danger is that a regression model may include an ex-
planatory variable that produces a high level of pay explanation (high
R 2) but obscures the true effect of sex because of its correlation with
sex and pay. This could occur, for example, if job tenure were the
dominant determinant of salaries within job levels, and all female em-
ployees were terminated after three years of employment. Alterna-
tively, one could conclude that in this example women were the
victims of discharge, rather than pay, discrimination.
Courts must judge the probative value of sex coefficients from the
logic of the regression model. They should be wary of these coeffi-
cients, however, when they appear in regressions that explain little
pay variation.124
122. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Vuyanich v. Repub-
lic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 273 (N.D. Tex. 1980). But see EEOC v.
IBM Corp., 583 F. Supp. 875, 899 (D. Md. 1984) (finding that extremely low R2
values (below .02) indicate that current appraisal and time in position are poor
predictors of salary and salary level); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566 F. Supp. 1166,
1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (lower R2 values resulting from plaintiff's preferred vari-
ables resulted in suggestion that plaintiff's model was unreliable).
123. Fisher, supra note 43, at 725.
124. See, e.g., Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards,
Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1299 (1984).
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D. Regression Interpretation
While a number of courts have shown remarkable comprehension
of the results of complex multiple regressions, there have been
enough misinterpretations to conclude that court interpretation of re-
gression results is problematic.
In Segar v. Civiletti, 25 the court mistakenly interpreted R 2 as a
measure of "total variance in the dependent variable that is associated
with variations in the independent variable,"126 race in this instance.
Consequently, the court attributed all of the explained variance in pay
(R2 values ranged from .21 to .52) to race, not realizing that other in-
dependent variables also contributed.
In James v. Stockham Valve & Fitting Co.,127 the court of appeals
rejected the use of years of schooling in a pay regression because
schooling was not a hiring requirement in the firm.128 While this vari-
able is often of limited value for explaining employee pay differences,
it may well be that, within job levels, years of schooling and job per-
formance are positively correlated regardless of whether schooling is a
hiring requirement. The relevant question is whether employees with
greater schooling receive more pay, after controlling for other pay de-
terminants. That inquiry can only be answered by including quantity
of schooling in a pay regression. Forcing elimination of the schooling
variable may produce a spurious discrimination coefficient.
The lengthy analysis of multiple regression in Vuyanich was gen-
erally commendable but, unfortunately, was wrong in an aspect cru-
cial to the court's finding of pay discrimination based on race. One of
the plaintiff's regression models in that case included job evaluation
points as a variable for controlling job level. This variable reduced the
race coefficient from approximately -20 percent of white male pay in
the regressions without it, to approximately -10 percent in the regres-
sions that included job evaluation points.129 In other words, the plain-
tiff's regression found less pay discrimination when job level was
controlled than when it was not. The defendant then submitted a re-
gression that included many establishment oriented variables and
showed no effect of race on pay. The defense's regression did not,
however, include job evaluation points or any other job control varia-
ble, and for this reason, the court ruled that the defendant had failed
to rebut the plaintiff's regression results.130 As a matter of law, the
125. 508 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1981).
126. Id. at 697.
127. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977). This ruling is criticized in Gwartney, Asher, Ha-
worth & Haworth, Statistics, the Law and Title VI: An Economist's View, 54
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 633, 644 n.25 (1979).
128. James v. Stockham Valve & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310, 332 (5th Cir. 1977).
129. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 292-97 (S.D. Tex.
1980).
130. Id. at 308.
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court was correct that job level should have been controlled in order
to assess the pay discrimination claim. But the court should have been
able to see that inclusion of a job level variable in the defense's regres-
sions would not have increased the race coefficient of pay from the
fact that when a job level variable was added to the plaintiff's regres-
sions, it reduced the race coefficients. Therefore, the conclusion that
the defense's regression did not show nondiscrimination in the salaries
of nonwhite employees, because of the absence of a job level control
variable, was nonsensical. The defense, surprisingly, had shown non-
discrimination in pay without using a job level variable.13' Its proce-
dure was wrong under my interpretation of Title VII law, but
presumably made the defense more difficult than it would have been
with a job level control. The defense's showing of nondiscrimination
should not have been rejected because it did not employ a variable
that could have only worked in its favor.
Perhaps the most peculiar interpretation of a pay regression was
by the fifth circuit in Wilkins v. University of Houston.32 The plain-
tiff at trial had presented only nonregression statistics; however, the
defense had submitted a regression that showed a negative effect on
annual salary of $694 for being female!133 This coefficient was statisti-
cally significant, but the appeals court disregarded it, for a reason dis-
cussed below, and because the addition of the sex variable to the
regression equation only raised the proportion of pay variation ex-
plained from .52 to .53. The court stated that the plaintiff had not
shown that sex was not independent of the other explanatory vari-
ables; therefore, the contribution of the sex variable to R 2 was not un-
derstated and that very small contribution was insufficient to prove
discrimination.134
While the court's interpretation of these results was theoretically
possible, it was highly unlikely. It was much more likely that sex was
correlated with one or more of the other independent variables, and
that was why the addition of the sex variable increased R 2 so little
despite the sizeable sex coefficient of pay. Regardless, the sex coeffi-
cient itself, not its contribution to R2 , is the proper indicator of
whether discrimination exists, as long as the pay model is conceptually
sound. Why a correlation matrix (showing the correlations among all
independent variables) was not submitted to the trial court, so that the
intercorrelation question could be answered definitively, is not clear.
Following this decision, the plaintiffs petitioned for a re-hearing,
131. Perhaps job level was omitted to avoid the criticism (invalid) that job assignments
were based on sex and race and, therefore, should not be included in the pay
regression.
132. 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 662 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
133. Id. at 403.
134. Id. at 403-04.
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relying in part on a document submitted by the university, Suggestion
of Error in Presentation of Statistical Evidence, in which the univer-
sity admitted an error in testimony by its expert.135 The expert had
testified that his regression without a sex variable showed that equal
proportions of men and women were "underpaid" and "overpaid"
when comparisons were made between actual salaries paid and those
estimated from the fitted regression equation. In fact, it was his re-
gression with a sex variable that showed equal pay for men and wo-
men (the negative sex coefficient "accounted" for the actual lower pay
of women), while the regression without a sex variable showed that
women were underpaid relative to men. The court had relied upon
this expert's testimony as one of the justifications for its conclusion
that the -$694 sex coefficient did not prove discrimination.136 With a
better understanding of regression analysis, both the trial and circuit
courts would have realized that where a regression equation produces
a -$694 sex coefficient for the sex variable, female salaries estimated
from a regression equation that excludes this variable will systemati-
cally overestimate female salaries compared to their actual salaries
(i.e., most women, but not men, will be underpaid relative to what the
pay model says they should earn).
Nonetheless, the fifth circuit refused a rehearing because the
"thrust" of its original conclusion remained unchanged: that (1) sex
increased the proportion of pay variation explained by less than one
percent; and (2) "plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the validity of
the regression model as a whole." 37 The court wrote:
Since multiple regression analysis is subject to misuse, courts cannot be ex-
pected to accept at face value conclusions derived from such a model absent
expert testimony concerning the validity of the model itself. In this case, the
class plaintiffs are attempting to use the university's own data to establish a
case of discrimination in faculty compensation. At trial, however, only one
expert attempted-on the university's behalf-to lay a foundation for the va-
lidity of the model used. As we have seen, the value of this expert's testimony
is now doubtful at best. Yet when the class plaintiffs purported to use the
university's statistics for their own purposes, they did not fulfill their burden
of showing that the multiple regression analysis model employed was valid.
Without guidance, this court cannot be expected to resolve in the class plain-
tiff's favor fundamental questions relating to the model itself.
1 3 8
It is an understatement to say that the court's ultimate decision
was ironic. The defense submitted a regression that provided evidence
of pay discrimination (the pay model used included a job rank variable
and was otherwise sound), yet the defense's expert was able to dis-
credit his own evidence in the eyes of confused trial and appeal courts
(and an apparently confused plaintiff) through testimony that was
135. Wilkins v. University of Houston, 662 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1981).
136. Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
137. Wilkins v. University of Houston, 662 F.2d 1156, 1157 (5th Cir. 1981).
138. Id.
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technically doubtful (the R2 interpretation) and admittedly erroneous
(the regression salary estimation). Upon learning that the defense ex-
pert had testified wrongly about his regression, instead of reaching the
seemingly required conclusion that the -$694 sex coefficient was proof
of discrimination, the court instead seized upon the defense expert's,
no doubt, inadvertent lapse to conclude that no expert support now
existed for the probative value of that coefficient. Since the defense
had the opportunity to try all kinds of models in its pre-trial regres-
sion analyses of pay, and apparently was unable to avoid a result that
showed discrimination, the court should have accepted that result.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Confusion prevails about what constitutes pay discrimination
under Title VII. The confusion is not over so-called comparable worth
claims. Nearly all courts agree that these claims, insofar as they re-
quire a court to judge the comparative value, worth, or work require-
ments of jobs, are not cognizable.139 Pay discrimination claims
involving unequal jobs are allowable, but, as in Gunther, the claims
must be based upon direct evidence that the pay differentials were
established on the basis of sex or race, and cannot be based merely
upon job comparisons.
Rather, the existing confusion comes about through court assess-
ment of multiple regression evidence submitted in pay claims. Some
courts credit regressions that compare the different salaries of em-
ployees who hold unequal jobs, while other courts reject this evidence
and only credit regressions that control for the job level of employees.
I have contended in this Article that regressions that compare the
salaries and characteristics of employees in unequal jobs are improper
evidence of pay discrimination under Title VII because, as evidence of
pay claims, these regressions implicitly judge the comparable worth of
unequal jobs, to the effect that salary differences among an establish-
ment's jobs must correspond to differences in the schooling and expe-
rience of the employees who hold these jobs. Even if comparable
worth judgments were authorized, these establishment-wide human
capital regressions would be of no evidentiary value for pay claims be-
cause they impose on employers pay criteria-usually quantities of
schooling and experience-that have no statutory basis. Establish-
ment-wide regressions that encompass unequal jobs may constitute in-
ferential evidence of discrimination in job allocation; courts that have
credited these regressions for pay claims appear not to distinguish be-
tween discrimination in pay and in job allocation. Even for job alloca-
tion claims, however, the sex coefficient in establishment-wide pay
regressions is ambiguous, because it incorporates sexual pay differ-
139. For the only exception known to me, see supra text accompanying note 24.
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ences within job levels as well as across them. Consequently, the coef-
ficient cannot distinguish between discrimination in job allocation and
in pay treatment within job levels.
Disparate pay treatment, in terms of initial salary and salary pro-
gression, is a cognizable pay claim, even when the employees com-
pared hold unequal jobs. Regressions that control for job level get at
this kind of discrimination and do not produce comparable worth com-
parisons as long as each job level has just one basic salary and range.
Resolution of this conflict over the regression evidence that is
proper for pay claims will be important for the success of class pay
claims. If the first view were to prevail-that regressions over une-
qual jobs are proper-plaintiffs success would be largely assured since
human capital regressions cannot ordinarily explain the sex differ-
ences in pay that accompany concentration of females in low paid jobs.
On the other hand, if the view prevails that job level must be taken
into account (controlled), plaintiffs chances for showing pay discrimi-
nation would be much less. I believe that the latter view is correct
under Title VII law. If the courts adopt that position, the principal
statutory remedy for the low average earnings of females will remain
claims of discrimination in job allocation.
Multiple regression is a powerful and indispensible tool for the ad-
judication of pay, as well as other discrimination claims, but it is not a
simple one. The courts have made errors in their application and in-
terpretation judgments when dealing with regression evidence, but
there is no reason why this tendency cannot be kept at normal error
levels as familiarity with regression techniques increases. The pos-
sibilities for judicial error arise more from issues about the correct ap-
plication of regression evidence to pay discrimination law than from
issues about the technical aspects of this statistical tool itself.
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